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Abstract 
 
 
Academic treatments of distributive justice normally adopt a static approach 
centred on resource allocation among a set of individual agents.  The resulting 
models, expressed in mathematical language, make no allowance for culture, as 
they QHYHUHQJDJHZLWK WKHVRFLHW\¶VZD\RI OLIHRU the moulding of individuals 
within society.  This paper compares the static approach to distributive justice 
with a cultural one, arguing that a case for redistribution should rest upon its 
cultural effects in assisting well-being and social cohesion.  Unless we recognise 
culture, we can have little understanding of why inequalities matter, where they 
come from, and how they might be reduced.  Redistribution may be motivated by 
universal value judgements taken from external sources, but it also entails internal 
cultural changes that refashion social relations through cumulative causation.  In 
practical terms, it has to penetrate beyond reallocating resource endowments to 
bring revised attitudes in a society less tolerant of unequal outcomes.  Egalitarian 
reforms will flourish only if they generate and reflect an egalitarian culture. 
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Introduction 
 
Equity and equality are much discussed in the academic literature on distributive justice, but 
from a narrow perspective.  Analysis revolves around allocating resources among a set of 
individual agents: egalitarians would choose a more even allocation over a less even one.  To 
simplify things, inequality is often condensed to one dimension (usually income or wealth) 
and equitable distribution becomes a cake-dividing puzzle, as if an outside observer could 
decide on fair shares.   The simplified framework facilitates mathematical modelling at the 
expense of putting distribution within its social and historical context. 
 
    Omitted from the allocative view of equality is any mention of culture defined as either a 
way of life or process.  Culture as a way of life refers to everyday activities, attitudes and 
beliefs.  Exclusive stress on resource allocation neglects the non-material elements of a way 
of life, along with the social consequences of inequality.  Culture as a process links the 
individual and social levels to document how the social environment shapes human beings ± 
it deals with what economists would call preference formation.  Static models of 
redistribution assume fixed preferences from the outset with no effort to explain their origin 
or social background.  Important issues are brushed aside: the roots of inequality, how it is 
perpetuated, how it channels SHRSOH¶VOLYHVZK\we care about it, and how we might reduce 
it.  The cultural vacuum shrinks egalitarianism down to an abstract assignment of resources 
among an atomistic population of individual units. 
 
    A wider view of equality would recognise culture by looking at a way of life rather than 
resource allocation and asking how unequal societies come forth.  History, cumulative 
causation and belief systems could then claim their due place in the discussion.  If we argue 
that equality transforms society by fostering social solidarity and communal values, then we 
make a cultural case for it, where it becomes both cause and effect of changing attitudes.  
Preferences cannot then be fixed, as the desire for equality turns on how it changes them for 
the better.  Distributive justice branches out beyond an allocation problem. 
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    Culture as a way of life includes attitudes to inequality held by the general public.  A 
cultural approach should acknowledge everyday notions of justice and injustice that have 
little to do with academic theories but appear regularly in conversation, opinion polls, voting 
behaviour and the media.  The public may commend inequalities, keep silent about them 
(thereby tacitly accepting the status quo) or criticise them as being unfair.  Much disapproval 
of inequality is voiced by members of the poor against other poor people thought to have 
secured small but unjustified advantages; it FDQ EH KHDUG LQ WKH ODQJXDJH RI µVFURXQJLQJ¶
µIUHH-ULGLQJ¶ µJHWWLQJVRPHWKLQJIRUQRWKLQJ¶ µZRUNHUVYHUVXVVKLUNHUV¶ DQGµVWrivers versus 
VNLYHUV¶.  Similar disapproval could be directed against the rich, especially those with 
inherited wealth and unearned incomes, although the complaints tend to be rarer and more 
muted.  Popular sentiments about inequality yield an informal, bottom-up brand of 
distributive justice that stands beside the top-down, academic brand. 
 
    The present paper examines the significance of culture for distributive justice, formal or 
informal.  It begins by looking in further detail at the static, culture-free approach, before 
moving on to alternative, culturally based arguments and locating them within a different 
theoretical framework.  The last two sections consider the practical implications of a 
culturally sensitive viewpoint and draw general conclusions. 
 
 
 
 
Distributive justice without culture   
 
Academic debates on distributive justice are apt to treat it as a topic in analytical philosophy 
± the aim is to find logical decision rules to allocate resources optimally among individual 
agents typically modelled as rational utility maximisers with fixed preferences (Roemer, 
1996; Sen, 1997; Moulin, 2003).  The individualistic method addresses inequalities among 
individuals but pays less attention to social classes, structures or institutions, which are 
secondary and noticed only if they impinge on distribution at the individual level.  Since 
analysis takes place inside a single period, redistribution would have to be a one-shot 
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reallocation of resource endowments.  Nothing is said about how the current allocation 
emerged, why it has persisted or how it might evolve: assessment is hemmed within a 
timeless, artificial realm. 
 
    Value judgements in the Benthamite, utilitarian tradition would select individual utilities as 
the yardstick of welfare and maximise the sum of utilities over the whole population to 
achieve the highest possible total.  This may not be egalitarian, for it values total utility 
regardless of distribution and awards priority to agents who produce the most utility from 
given resources (Sen, 1997, Chapter 1).  Equality would be optimal only if everybody had the 
same utility function with diminishing marginal utility; otherwise the optimum is unequal and 
may endorse discrimination against the sick, disabled, elderly, etc.  A greater degree of 
egalitarianism requires a concave objective function that values even distributions of utility 
above uneven ones ± the more concave, the more egalitarian (Moulin, 2003, Chapter 3).    
Judgements are made first about the utility distribution and then, through utilities, about the 
distribution of incomes and other resources.  As with individual preferences, the origin of 
egalitarian values passes unremarked and we are not told why we should want equality or 
how we could attain it.   
 
    Distributive justice based solely on utilities µwelfarism¶has obvious drawbacks: utility is 
poorly defined and not directly observable, may be an unreliable indicator of well-being, and 
may not represent rational behaviour.  Critics of welfarism from within the static perspective 
have proposed adding non-utility information into welfare assessments so as to supplement or 
replace utility: 6HQ¶VFDSDELOLW\DSSURDFK, for example, replaces utility with the capability to 
function and participate in social activities (Sen, 1993).  Non-utility information offsets the 
pre-eminence of utilities and creates space for social determinants of personal capabilities.  
The capability approach is essentially individualistic, however, and says little about culture, 
social structures or ways of life (Jackson, 2005; Dean, 2009; Sayer, 2012).  In order to get 
further away from welfarism, one needs a deeper account of culture and social context. 
 
    The static perspective follows the linear sequence in Figure 1.  At the starting point comes 
distributional information on incomes, goods and other resources.  Under welfarism, this 
must filter through individual preferences before social welfare can be assessed, introducing 
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utilities as another stage in the sequence.  Any case for redistribution comes from basic value 
judgements about the distribution of utilities.  The external source of the values leads to a 
fact/value split LQ ZKLFK D µSRVLWLYH¶ DQDO\VLV RI UHVRXUFH DOORFDWLRQ is transmuted into a 
µQRUPDWLYH¶ blueprint for redistribution when values are appended.  Both individual 
preferences and basic value judgements stay fixed and distinct from each other, without 
interaction or historical development.  In non-welfarist variants of the static perspective, 
non-utility information can enter directly into welfare assessments that reach beyond utilities 
alone (Sen, 1982, Part IV).  The ethics remain individualistic, because value judgements still 
rest on individuals, as against social structures, classes or other groups.  Adherence to the 
linear sequence gives the literature on distributive justice a strong family resemblance, even 
though it is portrayed as a series of welfarist and non-welfarist alternatives. 
 
 
 
Figure 1:  Static distributive justice 
 
 
                                                                Positive     Normative                                                                           
 
                                                                                      Basic value judgements 
 
 
          Income,                   Individual utilities                  Social welfare               Egalitarianism 
          goods, etc. 
 
 
                              Non-utility information 
 
 
 
 
 
    Figure 1 lends itself to mathematical expression but cannot readily accommodate culture as 
a way of life or process.  Ethics are separated from the past and future to be collapsed into a 
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technical problem of maximising an objective function for an anonymous bunch of 
individuals at a single, unspecified time.  The individualistic method and dearth of social 
structures mirrors how orthodox economic theory has become desocialised (Jackson, 2013).  
Social influences on the individual are at best implicit, playing no overt part in the analysis, 
and ethics must hinge on individual welfare.  Culture as a process, whereby individual 
preferences are formed within society, would swap the linearity of Figure 1 for circularity 
that permits backward causation from the social to the individual.  A cultural outlook 
demands an alternative vision awake to the social formation of preferences and values. 
 
 
 
 
Cultural arguments for equality   
 
Disquiet about static, ahistorical theorising has long been voiced, dating back to the onset of 
utilitarianism and classical economics in the early nineteenth century.  Criticism came from 
writers in the Romantic tradition who focused on the neglect of history and culture in 
economic theorising (Ryan, 1981; Löwy, 1987; Löwy and Sayre, 2001; Connell, 2001; 
Jackson, 2009, Chapter 3).  They saw economists as promulgating mechanistic theories that 
erased the human life from economics and condoned the harsh social conditions bred by early 
capitalism.  Many of these critics were prominent literary authors and commentators 
(including Edmund Burke, William Blake, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, William Cobbett, 
Thomas Carlyle, Charles Dickens, Elizabeth Gaskell, John Ruskin and Matthew Arnold), but 
they stood outside the economics profession and had little sway over the practice of 
economics.  Few of them are regarded as egalitarians ± their ideal was often to have 
benevolent, paternalistic leadership rather than equality.  The cultural critiques do not 
preclude a case for equality, though, and can be turned in that direction. 
 
    An early statement of the cultural arguments for equality was made by Matthew Arnold in 
his 1878 essay Equality (Arnold, 1986).  Equality, for Arnold, is to be valued not as an 
abstract principle or natural right but for its contribution to social cohesion and the 
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complexion of everyday life.  A society marked by extreme inequalities of income, wealth 
and status loses the shared interests and experiences needed to forge common values and 
friendship among all individuals and groups.  Social divisions are institutionalised into a 
permanent hierarchy with adverse effects on both rich and poor.  The rich, enjoying inherited 
fortunes, are spoiled from birth, relieved of any constructive social purpose, flattered and 
pampered by ingrained deference, and subject to the temptations proffered by idleness and 
lavish material wealth.  The poor face difficulties of subsistence, lack the material and social 
advantages possessed by their fellow citizens, find themselves at the bottom of the hierarchy, 
and become excluded from full participation in society.  Social divisions when established are 
taken for granted in what Arnold termed DµUHOLJLRQRILQHTXDOLW\¶%HOLHIVVXSSRUWLYHRIthe 
status quo enter the national culture, thus legitimising the social order and suppressing debate 
over reforms. 
 
    The questions raised by Arnold were discussed at length by R.H. Tawney in his classic 
book Equality, first published in 1931 (Tawney, 1964).  As an economic historian he was 
attuned to cultural thought, having stressed how cultural and religious values guided capitalist 
economic development (Tawney, 1920, 1926,QHTXDOLW\LQ7DZQH\¶VYLHZFDQQHYHUMXVW
be about uneven distribution of resources or asymmetries among specialised economic 
functions: these are at the core of inequality but far from the whole picture.  Enquiry must 
extend beyond the material dimension to embrace the social structure of a society, as well as 
its beliefs and values.  An unequal society is unequal not only in its resource allocation but in 
its social roles, personal relationships and attitudes ± various dimensions are entwined to 
make up a generalised hierarchy reproduced across generations.  The dominant values justify 
inequality and confirm it as the natural order, so the only route to greater equality is to 
challenge them and loosen their grip.  If they endure, then progress towards equality will be 
modest at best and prone to counter-attack. 
 
    Within economics, the role of culture in preserving inequalities has been emphasised by 
institutionalist writers (Galbraith, 1992; Stanfield, 1995; Dugger, 1996; Zafirovski, 2000; 
Brinkman and Brinkman, 2005; Streeck, 2011).  Pivotal here are the µHQDEOLQJP\WKs¶ WKDW
rationalise disparities in income and status, asserting that people receive their due rewards 
and should be happy with inequality (Dugger, 1998, 2000).   Privileged elites supposedly 
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deserve their good fortune through their superior abilities, skills, intellect and knowledge.  
The poor merit their lowly status because they lack the talents, enterprise and application 
essential for success: they are the culprits of their own misfortune in a fair world.  Lower 
social classes will be more likely to go along with the status quo if they can be persuaded to 
defer to the upper classes and try to emulate them.  Spread throughout a society, these 
attitudes ratify a hierarchical way of life.  The privileged rest at ease, sure that their 
conspicuous wealth and consumption will be accepted and even admired by the mass of 
people below ± what Thorstein 9HEOHQ WHUPHG WKH µOHLVXUH FODVV¶ OLYHs at a standard miles 
above the average without having to work and without having its idleness queried (Veblen, 
1899).  Hierarchies built into social attitudes cannot be dismantled at a stroke by 
redistributive measures; as products of culture they can be removed only through cultural 
change.  Egalitarianism has to take us from a culture of enabling myths to one that cherishes 
equality and rejects social divisions. 
 
    Outside economics, the cultural aspects of inequality have been highlighted by recent 
social theory, with the work of Pierre Bourdieu as the exemplar (Swartz, 1977, 1997, 
Chapter 8; Savage, 2000, Chapter 5; Crompton, 2008, Chapter 6).  For Bourdieu, inequalities 
in culture sustain and legitimise inequalities in income or wealth: economic capital is 
accompanied by other kinds of capital (social, cultural, symbolic) that have parallel 
inequalities (Bourdieu, 2002).  Privileged social classes are sanctioned by property ownership 
but cement their status through their cultural milieu, which gives access to the arts and plenty 
of free time for artistic connoisseurship.  Cultural inequalities can be replicated by informal 
means, even when education is formally open and meritocratic (Bourdieu and Passeron, 
1990).  Teaching people about the arts would disseminate knowledge but would not tear 
down the cultural walls between classes.  Unequal distribution of cultural capital finds an 
outlet in consumer tastes that take on a layered quality delineated by social hierarchies 
(Bourdieu, 1984)%RXUGLHX¶Vwork on consumption has DIILQLWLHVZLWK9HEOHQ¶VLQVWLWXWLRQDO
economics, exploring the class divisions in consumer behaviour and the inducements for 
ordinary people to covet the lifestyle of the rich (Campbell, 1995; Rosenbaum, 1999; 
Bögenhold, 2001; Trigg, 2001; Shipman, 2004).  Consumption acquires symbolic value over 
and above any value in fulfilling material needs, so theories dwelling on the material 
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dimension will be blinkered.  A true understanding of inequality must deal with its numerous 
interrelated dimensions and how it has been socially constructed. 
 
 
 
 
Common features of the cultural arguments   
 
The writers who have discussed inequality from a cultural viewpoint belong to no single 
movement and advocate no single theory; they are scattered across academic disciplines, 
some standing outside academia, and cannot be categorised as a school of thought.  They 
nonetheless share ideas that distinguish them from the egalitarianism put forward in static 
notions of distributive justice.  Without wanting to play down the differences, one can 
summarise common features:  
 
Multidimensionality  -  Cultural arguments for equality apply to DVRFLHW\¶Vway of life, not 
the allocation of incomes and other resources.  Several dimensions are involved, so it is 
impossible to reduce inequalities to a single, measurable scale.  Welfare assessment must go 
EH\RQGVHOHFWLQJWKHµULJKW¶GLPHQVLRQXWLOLW\LQFRPHJRRGVHWF 
 
Social structures -  Appraising social structures is fundamental to a cultural approach.  
Egalitarian arguments make little sense if they overlook how individuals are socialised into a 
hierarchical, structured way of life (culture as a process). 
 
Ideology  -  Unequal arrangements are defended by an ideology that depicts them as 
inevitable and banishes more equal alternatives (enabling myths, a religion of inequality).  
The ideology purports to be self-evident and impervious to serious criticism, a distillation of 
eternal realities. 
 
Preference formation  -  Beliefs that encourage acquiescence in an unequal society will 
change individual behaviour.  Preferences should not be viewed as fixed, and the origin of 
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beliefs should be considered.  A population brought up to abide by inequalities will actively 
participate in their reproduction. 
 
Adverse effects on the individual  -  Long-standing inequalities harm all individuals, both rich 
and poor, and damage their social relationships.  The rich become selfish, arrogant and 
complacent in the assurance that their advantages are warranted, as are the disadvantages of 
those beneath them.  The poor become segregated, listless, resigned to their fate but perhaps 
envious of their superiors and aspiring to join the rich.   
 
Adverse effects on society  -  Inequality yields a less cohesive and harmonious society.  
Lower classes, excluded from participation in social activities, will feel alienated.  Upper 
classes, facing the resentment of the poor, will retreat into their own social circles and stay as 
far from the poor as they can.  Instead of being cohesive, society will fragment into separate, 
sometimes antagonistic groups.   
 
Power and authority -  Culture as a way of life incorporates the asymmetrical power and 
authority that maintain inequalities and block attempts at reform.  Reallocating resources is 
necessary but insufficient for greater equality, which depends on recasting institutions and 
reducing tolerance of big disparities in economic and social power. 
 
Internalised values  -  From a cultural perspective, egalitarian values cannot merely be tacked 
on to an otherwise value-free analysis.  Values that influence behaviour will have to be 
internalised into the culture.  A quest for equality must emerge through cultural change, even 
if it is not unique to the society and originates in universal value judgements.   
 
Cumulative causation  -  Cultural changes occur in historical time, subject to cumulative 
causation.  Whenever inequalities are established, they will increase through economies of 
scale, competitive advantage, concentrated power and property inheritance.  Egalitarianism 
must seek to reverse the cumulative trends, creating a virtuous circle of greater equality. 
 
Outcomes not opportunities  -  Arguments for equality of opportunity are too weak to 
generate an egalitarian culture.  Under equal opportunities, people have the same life chances 
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but PD\ µFKRRVH¶ XQHTXDO RXWFRPHV that are deemed acceptable.  A thoroughgoing 
egalitarianism should have a desire for equal outcomes at the forefront of social attitudes. 
 
 
 
 
Distributive justice with culture         
 
The cultural arguments for equality see it as more than a trait of a population of individuals, 
given that it changes people¶V EHKDYLRXU and aids their relationships.  If we are to 
acknowledge how preferences are formed and how values persist within the ongoing social 
context, we need a non-reductionist social theory that encompasses agency-structure 
interaction: individual agents can then be shaped within society and social structures 
produced and reproduced through individual agency (see, for example, Bourdieu, 1977 and 
Giddens, 1984).  Similar social theories are set out by critical realist writers, who avoid 
reductionism and pay heed to culture and agency-structure interaction when making 
assumptions about the nature of reality (Bhaskar, 1979; Archer, 1995, 1996; Lawson, 1997, 
Part III).  A non-reductionist stance implies that Figure 1 must be inadequate, as it omits 
social structures and imposes fixed individual preferences as the arbitrary basis for value 
judgements.  Once social structures are a level of analysis in their own right, coeval with the 
individual level, methodological individualism is ruled out.  Values may not be concerned 
only with individual states but with personal relationships, group interests and social 
cohesion.  Egalitarianism becomes a circular process of cultivating and preserving values 
woven into the fabric of society. 
 
    Figure 2 shows the resulting theoretical framework.  At the heart lies the interplay of 
agency and structure augmented by egalitarian values, such that the wish for equality 
impresses upon current behaviour and institutions: agency upholds egalitarian values, while 
social structures embody egalitarian reforms.  Basic value judgements may still enter from 
outside as the catalyst for the internal forces driving egalitarianism.  Practical benefits 
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emanate on the right of Figure 2 in a more cohesive, less divided society and a more even 
distribution of incomes, capabilities and other outcomes. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2:  Cultural versions of distributive justice 
 
 
 
 
 
                                     Egalitarian reforms                   Social structures              
                            
                                                                                                                                    Social cohesion 
  Basic value 
  judgements 
                              
                                                                                                                                    Individual incomes, 
                                       Egalitarian values                  Individual agents                     capabilities, etc. 
                         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    Unlike the linear sequence of Figure 1, egalitarianism in Figure 2 is a self-reinforcing 
process occurring in historical time.  The case for equality, if it is to have practical success, 
must be absorbed into values and reproduced through cultural transmission.  As soon as the 
relevant values enter the culture, the positive/normative barrier breaks down, with basic value 
judgements no longer inserted at a late stage into a positive analysis.  Values bearing on 
social conditions must be present within the society and not limited to a hypothetical 
assessor. 
 
    Internalisation of values stops short of moral relativism that abandons universal principles 
and treats each society as morally unique.  From a relativistic angle, societies differ in their 
values with no presumption in favour of equality ± Figure 2 could be adapted to inegalitarian 
values and reforms.  Unequal societies have their enabling myths that justify inequality and 
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spread the associated values as widely as possible among the public.  A generic case for 
equality has to include cross-cultural values external to the societies under consideration.  
Many of the cultural arguments summarised above are global and proclaim the benefits of 
greater equality at any time or place.  They appeal to culture but keep away from relativism 
that might be neutral towards distribution.  Absolute arguments for equality are supported by 
the recent empirical literature that examines the effects of inequality on health and well-being 
(Hagerty, 2000; 2¶&RQQHOO  Neckerman and Torche, 2007; Phelan, Link and 
Tehranifar, 2010; Wilkinson and Pickett, 2010; Oishi, Kesebir and Diener, 2011; Cooper, 
McCausland and Theodossiou, 2013, 2015).  The main finding is that more equal societies 
fare better on a range of welfare criteria, irrespective of local variations in culture and 
institutions.  Basic value judgements making a universal case for equality can be introduced 
from outside a society, as in Figure 2, and then call forth an egalitarian culture within the 
society.  External in origin, they must percolate through the culture before they can influence 
behaviour.   
 
    Being circular, Figure 2 has no starting or finishing point.  Nor does its circularity go in 
one direction ± this can vary according to how we interpret things.  Suppose, for example, 
that we begin with individual agents at the lower right-hand side of Figure 2.  In the 
agency-structure relation the initial causal thrust is upward and causality seems 
anti-clockwise: individual agents reproduce social structures, which preserve egalitarian 
reforms, which help to sustain egalitarian values, which impact upon individual agency and 
preferences.  Causality comes full circle and starts all over again.  Suppose, on the other 
hand, that we begin with social structures at the upper right-hand side of Figure 2.  Now the 
initial causal thrust is downward and causality seems clockwise: social structures mould 
individual agents, who have egalitarian values, which promote egalitarian reforms, which 
alter social structures.  Causality again comes full circle but this time in the opposite 
direction.  The complex, two-way interaction means that motion can be perceived as going 
either way: an individualistic interpretation suggests anti-clockwise motion, a structural 
interpretation clockwise.  Figure 2 entails neither individualistic nor structural reductionism, 
and the two circular motions are equivalent. 
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    The ethics in Figure 2, thanks to their avoidance of individualistic reductionism, are not 
confined to comparisons among individuals.  In a circular process of cultural reproduction we 
cannot pick out fixed individual preferences as the foundation for allocative decisions.  Basic 
value judgements enter into the circular causality that determines the VRFLHW\¶Vway of life.  
Without an individualistic benchmark, egalitarian values are released from the obligation to 
boil everything down to the individual level and can embrace factors other than individual 
welfare.  Judgements can be made directly about social structures and relationships: ethics 
can evaluate social hierarchies, power, work organisation and family arrangements.  
Individual welfare loses its monopoly on how social outcomes are judged, and appraisal of 
structural context comes into play.  Neither individual nor structural levels have ethical 
sovereignty. 
 
    Figure 2 does not compel us to choose among income, utility and other dimensions, an 
issue that preoccupies much of the standard literature on distributive justice.  The urge to 
have one dimension comes from the desire to quantify welfare on a single scale.  A cultural 
approach GHDOVZLWKDVRFLHW\¶VZD\RIOLIHWKDWFRPSULVHVYDULRXVGLPHQsions, none of which 
has supremacy ± electing to operate on a single one would be misguided.  Material resources 
are not exhaustive in the assessment of welfare.  Social justice should venture beyond 
distribution of material resources to take in cultural matters such as social inclusiveness, 
status differences and recognition of minority groups (Fraser, 1995, 2003; Sayer, 2005; 
Lister, 2007).  Multiple strands of inequality can exist in themselves without being weighted 
and combined into an overall welfare score.  It remains useful to measure inequalities in 
income, wealth, etc., and empirical studies retain their importance, though immeasurable 
dimensions of inequality should also be given due attention.     
 
    The theory in Figure 2 is stratified, with at least two levels of analysis ± individual agents 
and social structures ± that are irreducible to each other.  Inequalities pertain not only to 
persons but to impersonal roles and positions within firms, government, the media and other 
institutions.  Power concentrated among a few owners or managers will determine the 
working environment and have repercussions for society.  A thoroughgoing egalitarianism 
must be alert to roles and positions as well as personal circumstances ± the two are bound 
together, and sole emphasis on the personal level will be futile in curtailing inequality.  
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Structured relations among social classes and other groupings lead to asymmetries of 
property ownership, social/cultural capital and power.  If huge inequalities are embedded in 
social structures, then the chances of greater equality at the personal level are minimal.  
Egalitarianism has to stretch across many levels of analysis and include structural inequalities 
within its remit. 
 
 
 
 
Practical implications 
 
Although analyses of distributive justice are frequently ahistorical, the likelihood is that we 
are discussing a modern capitalist economy defined by private ownership of capital and 
ubiquitous markets for labour and finance.  Capitalism exists in several varieties, but they all 
approve of private capital accumulation as the vehicle for economic development.  
Simultaneously with the amassing of private capital comes the rise in private property 
incomes and wealth, with burgeoning inequality when wage incomes lag behind.  A capitalist 
economy, left unchecked, sponsors income and wealth gaps that get ever bigger and do not 
converge on a balanced equilibrium (Wade, 2004; Rigney, 2010, Chapter 3; Piketty, 2014).  
The gaps become institutionalised and justified by the culture, in the inegalitarian counterpart 
of Figure 2.  While the poor lose out, they are encouraged to be satisfied with any real income 
gains from economic growth or ambitions to join the rich. 
 
    Inegalitarian attitudes do seem to have thrived lately, for the ballooning inequalities in 
developed countries have been accepted by the general public and not met with widespread 
opposition (Horton and Bamfield, 2009; Kelly and Enns, 2010; Unwin, 2013, Chapter 3; 
Shildrick and McDonald, 2013).  Whether or not the public actually support inequality, they 
have been willing to comply with trends that benefit the rich and hurt the poor.  The lack of 
visible concern gives the impression that the rich somehow deserve their rewards, even 
though the reasons for this are seldom clarified (Rowlingson and Connor, 2011; Sachweh, 
2012).  In a culture accustomed to income and wealth accumulation, perceptions of inequality 
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will be dulled or biased and people may underestimate its extent (Norton and Ariely, 2011; 
Cruces, Perez-Truglia and Tetaz, 2013).  Any push towards progressive redistribution will 
happen only when attitudes swing back to egalitarianism. 
 
    Pursuit of equality within a capitalist economy is possible but faces an uphill task.  The 
role of the state will be crucial if ambiguous.  As Karl Polanyi pointed out, the state created 
capitalism (contrary to libertarian doctrines about spontaneous markets) and introduced 
welfare measures afterwards in order to soften its sharp edges ± state planning gazed first and 
foremost on markets rather than social policies (Polanyi, 1944).  Radical and Marxian writers 
have been sceptical of state activity under capitalism and viewed the welfare state as a 
palliative that PDNHVFRQFHVVLRQVWRZRUNHUV¶LQWHUHVWVEXWserves to legitimise the economic 
system (Gough, 1979; Mishra, 1981, Chapter 5; Offe, 1984; Pierson, 2006, Chapter 2).  Less 
sceptical were R.H. Tawney and Richard Titmuss, who saw the welfare state as a motor of 
social and cultural change with genuine transformative capacity (Reisman, 1982, Part II, 
2001; Alcock et al., 2001, Part 3; Deacon, 2002, Chapter 1).  Given the political will and 
democratic mandate, the state could implement a µstrategy of equality¶, in other words a 
comprehensive programme of measures designed to curb disparities of income and wealth 
(Tawney, 1964, Chapter IV).  Components of such a strategy would include welfare benefits, 
progressive taxation, socialised health care and education, subsidised public utilities, full 
employment policies, new types of property ownership, and reforms to the organisation of 
work.  As it unfolded, the strategy would gather momentum through the cumulative causation 
in Figure 2, which would halt and reverse the inegalitarian tendencies of laissez-faire 
capitalism. 
 
    Recent income trends in developed countries hint at both the feasibility of redistributive 
measures and the obstacles to them.  Empirical evidence divides into two contrasting periods: 
from the 1940s to the 1970s the personal income distribution became more equal and 
inequality measures fell, whereas from the 1980s onwards the inequality measures have risen 
as personal incomes have become more unequal (Caminada and Goudswaard, 2001; Alderson 
and Nielsen, 2002; Brandolini and Smeeding, 2009; McCall and Percheski, 2010; Atkinson, 
Piketty and Saez, 2011).  Factor incomes display a similar pattern, with a rising wage share of 
national income until the 1970s, followed by a falling wage share ever since (Kristal, 2010; 
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Wolff, 2010).  The earlier trend towards equality coincided with expansion of the welfare 
state during the post-war decades and high employment guaranteed by Keynesianism.  It 
demonstrated that, despite the capitalist environment, egalitarian policies can succeed.  The 
reversal of trend coincided with the turn to neo-liberalism from the 1980s, which brought 
welfare retrenchment, withdrawal of progressive taxation, privatisation of public services and 
utilities, deregulation of finance, deflationary macroeconomic policies, and rejection of the 
Keynesian commitment to full employment (Glyn, 2006; Irvin, 2008).  Neo-liberalism has 
restored the inegalitarian counterpart of Figure 2, supplanting egalitarian values and reforms 
with inegalitarian ones.  Even the financial crisis prompted only marginal adjustments rather 
than a search for alternatives, and the surrounding culture stays intact (Allon and Redden, 
2012; Glynos, Klimecki and Willmott, 2012).  Conventional wisdom is comfortable with 
enormous personal incomes, coupled with individualistic attitudes that spurn social cohesion 
and collective identity. 
 
    Attempts to regain the path of greater equality would have to slow down and reverse 
cumulative changes propelling the economy in the other direction.  Cumulative causation is 
self-reinforcing and never ends of its own accord ± to stop it requires some outside agency or 
event to intrude and disturb the circle (Skott, 1994; Berger, 2009; Pluta, 2010).  A renewed 
trend towards equality will come about only through dedicated government policies, a 
prospect that seems distant in WRGD\¶Vpolitical climate but might ultimately be provoked by 
the widening gulf between rich and poor.  Part of a new strategy of equality would be to 
revive the welfare measures and progressive taxation weakened under neo-liberalism.  
Tawney was aware that these policies on their own are insufficient for an egalitarian 
redrawing of society ± they are vital to any strategy of equality but fail to tackle the causes of 
inequality in the private sector (Martin, 1982; Elliott and Clark, 1989).  Stalwart 
egalitarianism cannot afford to ignore a private sector that authorises vast discrepancies in 
income and status: it would have to open out control of industry, give employees more clout 
over their working lives, and redress gross imbalances of power.  Marketisation and 
commodification would have to be resisted, leaving room for decommodification that bolsters 
non-market sectors of the economy (Williams, 2005, Part III; Vail, 2010).  In the long-term 
vision of Tawney and Titmuss, the gradual spread of an egalitarian culture could underpin 
evolutionary transformation towards a more cooperative, less competitive society.  At the 
 - 17 - 
 
moment this vision appears over-optimistic, but it still offers the best hope for attaining 
greater equality within a capitalist economy. 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Static concepts of distributive justice, which dominate the academic literature on the subject, 
are hampered by their neglect of culture.  When expressed in mathematical models, 
distribution becomes a timeless allocation problem, as if an omniscient ethical advisor could 
step up and reallocate resources to ensure fair shares.  Such ahistorical, non-cultural theory 
has little truck with the social consequences of inequality and, indeed, says nothing about 
why we might be egalitarians.  The result is a sterile exercise in meeting an objective that 
could quite as easily be inegalitarian.  It remains unclear how the chosen resource allocation 
could be reached, especially if it differs dramatically from the current one.  The political 
ramifications of reassigning property rights are sidestepped, and the cultural aspects of 
inequality are absent from the theoretical models.  Belying its apparently rigorous treatment, 
distributive justice shrivels into a one-dimensional mode adopted chiefly for analytical 
convenience. 
 
    Greater equality will occur only with a shift away from the ideology of laissez-faire 
capitalism, which tolerates and even celebrates inequalities.  Other belief systems, less 
tolerant of inequality, can be found in social democracy, socialism, communism, Marxism 
and so forth.  Egalitarianism in a capitalist economy could be carried out through progressive 
redistributive measures and social policies but would need a switch from neo-liberalism back 
to the social democratic values that held sway during the mid-twentieth century.  Stronger 
forms of egalitarianism that query the unequal property ownership under capitalism could not 
be brought to fruition in a capitalist economy.  Marxian views, for example, would dismiss 
private ownership of the means of production as being inherently exploitative and argue for 
non-capitalist alternatives with different property relations based on socialist or communist 
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guidelines.  These political matters lie beyond the scope of the present paper, but they 
illustrate the importance of culture and belief systems for enacting social change.   
 
    A cultural approach to distributive justice has two major advantages worth reiterating.  The 
first is that it can supply a proper rationale for egalitarianism by pondering the cultural effects 
of inequality.  Arguments for equality must explain why a more equal society is better than a 
less equal one, and the case has to invoke culture as a process ± equality is desirable because 
it can improve the well-being and behaviour of every member of society and strengthen 
social relationships.  People who are equal have more in common with each other and 
develop greater social harmony than they would if divided by large income and other gaps.  
These arguments are impossible in a static model where individual preferences are fixed and 
the case for equality relies on external value judgements: a reshuffle of resource endowments 
would leave people unchanged, the only gain being a higher score on an objective function, 
whatever that may mean.  If culture goes unmentioned, then the grounds for egalitarianism 
will be hazy. 
 
    The second advantage is that a cultural approach can address the cultural transmission of 
inequality.  Social divisions must have had historical origins ± inequalities in income are tied 
to inequalities in social position and bound up with beliefs and attitudes.  Long-standing 
disparities in income, status and power have been applauded by a culture of inequality and 
are perpetuated through that culture.  With cumulative causation, a society that welcomes 
inequalities will watch them grow as wealth becomes concentrated.  Egalitarian reform is not 
just about changing resource endowments but about reversing the social and cultural 
pressures towards inequality.  An absolute appeal for distributive justice can be introduced 
from outside but, if it is to change things, must have some purchase on the culture.  Equality 
would not then be imposed against the grain by central government but would permeate the 
cultural atmosphere at all levels and among all organisations: social symmetries would be 
preserved through reproduction of existing arrangements.  No longer an external goal, 
equality would be internalised as the norm.  Egalitarianism can prevail only if it becomes 
enshrined in social attitudes and gets passed on to future generations as a culture of equality.   
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